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I. Introduction 
Imagine you are called to serve on a federal grand jury.1 You 
sit all day listening to the prosecutor present evidence concerning 
an alleged criminal offense committed by a government official.2 
Along with your fellow jurors, you decide that before issuing an 
indictment, you want more documents produced or a government 
official to come testify before you.3 The prosecutor then issues a 
criminal grand jury subpoena to that government lawyer or 
official. Instead of those documents being presented to you, or a 
government official coming and testifying before you, the official 
evades the subpoena by asserting the government attorney-client 
privilege. You may think it a fundamental maxim of common law 
that a federal government entity could not assert the common law 
attorney-client privilege to “withhold information relating to a 
federal criminal offense,” but it is not.4 As well-established as the 
attorney-client privilege is in our legal system, the government 
attorney-client privilege is diametrically unsettled.5 This Note 
 
 1. See HANDBOOK FOR FEDERAL GRAND JURORS 6 (2012), 
https://perma.cc/VE29-MJL8 (PDF) (discussing how federal grand jurors are 
selected at random from lists of registered voters).  
 2. See id. at 8 (outlining how federal prosecutors present evidence to grand 
jurors).   
 3. See id. (authorizing the grand jurors to request additional witnesses); see 
also In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (issuing a subpoena to a 
government attorney to answer questions before the grand jury). 
 4. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1266.  
 5. See id. at 1272 (discussing the unsettled nature of the government 
attorney-client privilege and the differences between the government and 
ordinary attorney-client privilege); Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 
822, 836 (1871) (describing the ordinary attorney-client privilege rule as 
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proposes the adoption of a categorical rule that neither a state nor 
the federal government may invoke the attorney-client privilege in 
response to a criminal grand jury subpoena. 
The attorney-client privilege is an evidentiary principle and a 
longstanding creature of common law.6 The privilege is meant to 
encourage open and honest communication between lawyer and 
client, and it protects the disclosure of those communications.7 The 
privilege promotes the administration of justice by allowing 
individuals to confidentially communicate with skilled attorneys 
and receive sound legal advice.8 The privilege is not without 
limitations though, and should be applied narrowly due to its 
power to prevent the production of evidence in criminal cases.9 
Government attorneys and employees remain uncertain about 
whether the attorney-client privilege will apply to their 
communications when faced with a criminal grand jury 
subpoena.10 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had a 
chance to weigh in on the issue in 2018 for the first time, but it left 
many questions unanswered.11  
 
well-settled).  
 6. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (explaining that the common law “governs a claim 
of privilege” unless the Constitution, a federal statute, or rule prescribed by the 
Supreme Court applies); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) 
(“The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential 
communications known to the common law.”). 
 7. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389–90 (discussing the history and purpose of 
the attorney-client privilege).   
 8. See id. (describing how sound legal advice serves public ends, and sound 
advice requires full disclosure); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)  
As a practical matter, if the client knows that damaging information 
could more readily be obtained from the attorney following disclosure 
than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client would be 
reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain 
fully informed legal advice. 
 9. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403 (contending that testimonial privileges 
should be applied narrowly); see also In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(stating that because the privilege acts as an obstacle to evidence being heard in 
a court, it should be constrained).  
 10. See Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1272 (resigning that the government 
attorney-client privilege is uncertain). 
 11. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 909 F.3d 26, 27 (1st Cir. 2018) 
[hereinafter R.I. Grand Jury] (discussing the lower court’s adoption of “what it 
viewed to be the majority position on a difficult issue of first impression in this 
36 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 33 (2020) 
The First Circuit rejected the application of a categorical rule 
that the Rhode Island government could not assert the 
attorney-client privilege in response to a federal grand jury 
subpoena.12 Instead of applying a categorical rule, the court 
addressed a number of factors to determine the applicability of the 
privilege.13 The First Circuit court went so far as to say that the 
government attorney-client privilege analysis may hinge on who is 
the target or subject of the grand jury investigation.14 The First 
Circuit is the fifth court of appeals since 1997 to address the 
application of the attorney-client privilege to government 
attorneys when faced with a grand jury subpoena stemming from 
a criminal investigation.15 Each circuit took its own analytical 
approach to decide the issue, creating a split in the five circuits’ 
reasoning and holdings.16  
 
circuit”).  
 12. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 32 (failing to provide answers to more 
specific factors raised in the opinion and instead choosing to “simply reject the 
categorical rule that a state government has no attorney-client privilege that can 
be invoked in response to a grand jury subpoena”). 
 13. See id. at 31–32 (including whether there is a federal-state conflict, 
whether the government is the subject of the investigation itself, and where the 
public interest lies).  
 14. See id. (stating that if the alleged crimes had been committed by 
government actors, the argument against upholding the privilege would carry 
more weight).  
 15. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 924 (8th Cir. 
1997) [hereinafter Whitewater Investigation] (failing to apply the attorney-client 
privilege in order to protect the White House Counsel from having to disclose 
relevant communications in light of a federal grand jury subpoena); In re Witness 
Before the Special Grand Jury 2000-2, 288 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2002) 
[hereinafter Ill. Grand Jury] (finding that faced with a federal criminal 
investigation, no attorney-client privilege exists between state employee and 
state lawyer); In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that 
Deputy White House Counsel could not rely on the attorney-client privilege to 
decline answering questions presented by a grand jury). But see United States v. 
Doe, 399 F.3d 527, 536 (2d Cir. 2005) (failing to abrogate the attorney-client 
privilege by compelling chief legal counsel to disclose communication with the 
governor of Connecticut); R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 32 (holding that no 
categorical rule exists precluding government attorneys from asserting the 
privilege when faced with a criminal grand jury subpoena).  
 16. See, e.g., R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 32 (failing to sustain a broad no 
privilege rule, reasoning that something more is required to prevent the state 
from having the right to assert the privilege); Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1283 (stating 
that “government officials have responsibilities not to withhold evidence relating 
to criminal offenses from the grand jury”).  
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This Note explores the reasoning and factors used by each of 
the circuits in deciding whether or not to uphold the privilege. 
After considering those factors, this Note argues that there should 
be a categorical rule that neither a state nor the federal 
government may invoke the attorney-client privilege in response 
to a criminal grand jury subpoena. To justify this conclusion, this 
Note outlines how current government attorney-client privilege 
case law, as well as the policy underpinnings of the privilege itself, 
dictate that a categorical rule is appropriate.  
Part II discusses the historical foundation of the 
attorney-client privilege. The attorney-client privilege is one of the 
oldest privileges, but its applicability in specific instances has been 
left to the courts to decide.17 Part II then moves on to describe the 
purpose and importance of the attorney-client privilege. The 
purpose of the privilege is to encourage individuals needing legal 
assistance to consult attorneys with openness and honesty.18 The 
importance of the privilege rests on promoting the “broader public 
interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.”19 
Finally, Part II briefly discusses the mechanics of applying the 
privilege in everyday practice.  
Part III discusses the government attorney-client privilege. 
Part III highlights the recent developments in the government 
attorney-client privilege doctrine and lack of legal history to rely 
on in determining the scope of the privilege’s application in the 
government context.20 Part III then discusses whether the 
application of the government attorney-client privilege in the 
criminal investigation context would be an extension of the 
privilege or an exception to the privilege. Part III concludes that 
allowing the privilege to apply in this context would be an 
extension of the privilege.21 
 
 17. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389–90 (1981) (discussing 
the history of the privilege and its common law foundation).  
 18. See id. at 389 (outlining how consistent the purpose of the privilege has 
been throughout American jurisprudence).  
 19. Id. 
 20. See Ross. v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596, 601 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting 
how little case law there is concerning this issue).  
 21. See, e.g., In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing 
that the court needed to determine if this instance was captured by the outer 
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Part IV analyzes the five U.S. Court of Appeals’ opinions that 
have created a split in the government attorney-client privilege 
doctrine. The First Circuit rejected the categorical application of a 
rule that the attorney-client privilege would not be available to a 
government in response to a federal grand jury subpoena.22 The 
Second Circuit also ruled in favor of allowing the privilege to apply 
in this context.23 The D.C. Circuit, in arguably the most robust of 
the circuit opinions, held that government attorneys could not 
assert the privilege in order to withhold evidence sought in 
connection to a criminal grand jury investigation.24 The Eighth 
Circuit relied heavily on the public’s interest in disclosure by 
government officials when it denied the White House’s use of the 
attorney-client privilege to avoid the disclosure of communications 
to a federal grand jury.25 The Seventh Circuit also primarily relied 
on the duty government lawyers have to act in the interest of the 
public when it denied the application of the privilege in this 
context.26 While each of the circuits approached the issue in light 
of unique facts, each court provided analysis that can be used to 
find a more permanent solution to the issue as discussed in Part 
VI.27 
Part V discusses a solution to the circuit split that will help 
simplify the government attorney-client privilege doctrine while 
upholding the “logic of its principle.”28 Specifically, whether the 
 
limits of the privilege). 
 22. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2018) (stating that the facts 
of this case led to the conclusion that there should not be a categorical rule). 
 23. See United States v. Doe, 399 F.3d 527, 536 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that 
a government attorney can assert the privilege when faced with a federal grand 
jury subpoena).  
 24. See Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1282–83 (determining that government officials 
have a responsibility to the public that includes assisting criminal investigations). 
 25. See Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d 910, 920 (8th Cir. 1997) (denying 
that the result of their holding would be a chilling effect on government employees 
with respect to their candor with government counsel).  
 26. See Ill. Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289, 293 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that none 
of the conversations between the General Counsel and Secretary of State were 
privileged “in the face of a federal grand jury subpoena”).  
 27. See, e.g., R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 31 (factoring in federalism 
concerns, who is the target of the investigation, as well as the public’s interest in 
allowing government employees to communicate confidentially with government 
attorneys).  
 28. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2291 
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applicability of the government attorney-client privilege in the face 
of a federal grand jury subpoena should rest on a factors test or a 
categorical approach. Part V first explores whether it should 
matter if the government entity is a state or federal government 
actor.29 Second, Part V discusses the First Circuit’s hypothesis that 
the prosecutor may need to reveal certain information concerning 
the scope of the grand jury’s investigation in order to pierce the 
privilege.30 Finally, Part V analyzes whether the answer to the 
question of the privilege’s application is the creation of an ad hoc 
balancing test weighing the public’s interest. 
Part VI offers the conclusion that a categorical rule against 
the application of the government attorney-client privilege in 
response to a criminal grand jury subpoena is appropriate. This 
conclusion is supported by the need for a certain and consistent 
privilege.31 It is also supported by the concern that a testimonial 
privilege may prevent relevant evidence from being presented to a 
grand jury concerning potential criminal activity known to 
government officials.32 A categorical rule would also prevent the 
use of a balancing test, or arbitrary search for whether public 
interest favors the privilege or not.33 A categorical rule also 
benefits individuals working in the government by allowing them 
 
(John T. McNaughton ed., 1961). 
 29. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 31 (“Moreover, the federal-state conflict 
that the availability of the attorney-client privilege implicates may cut in favor of 
respecting the state’s view of the best balance between the public’s interest in 
government transparency and the beneficial aspects of the privilege.”); Ill. Grand 
Jury, 288 F.3d at 295 (recognizing that federalism is an important aspect of our 
system of governing, but failing to see how it is relevant in this instance). 
 30. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 32 (discussing the issue of the court not 
knowing whether the government entity was itself a target or subject of the grand 
jury’s investigation).  
 31. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 402–03 (1998) 
(overturning the lower court’s decision who had made the determination “that the 
uncertainty introduced by its balancing test was insignificant in light of existing 
exceptions to the privilege”). 
 32. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (highlighting the 
reasons why testimonial privileges should be interpreted narrowly).  
 33. See Swidler, 524 U.S. at 409 (discussing the Supreme Court’s resistance 
to creating balancing tests to define the outer limits of the privilege); Doe, 399 
F.3d at 531 (declining to adopt a balancing test, but then holding that the 
privilege will apply, without adopting or setting forth any judicially manageable 
test).  
40 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 33 (2020) 
to make informed decisions regarding their legal representation 
before consulting with a government attorney about conduct that 
could lead to a criminal investigation.34 
II. Introduction to the Attorney-Client Privilege 
A. Historical Foundation of the Attorney-Client Privilege 
The attorney-client privilege originated in the sixteenth 
century and is one of the “oldest common law privileges.”35 An 
exception to testimonial compulsion, the privilege belonged to the 
lawyer and was meant to protect an attorney’s honor by not forcing 
them to reveal private confidences in public.36 This “moral honor” 
reasoning lasted until the end of the 1700s.37 The theoretical 
underpinnings that replaced it are much more familiar, looking to 
“the necessity of providing subjectively for the client’s freedom of 
apprehension in consulting his legal advisor.”38 This major shift in 
policy meant that the privilege came to be understood to belong to 
the client and not the attorney.39 
United States case law concerning the privilege developed 
slowly prior to the early 1800s.40 The first reported case concerning 
the attorney-client privilege in the United States was Dixon v. 
 
 34. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (discussing the 
vital need for privileges to be consistent and for individuals to know confidently 
what will be covered before consulting with an attorney).  
 35. United States v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 66 F. Supp. 3d 406, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014); see also Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (discussing the privilege as “the oldest of 
the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law”).  
 36. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c 
(AM. LAW INST. 2000) (“The modern attorney-client privilege evolved from an 
earlier reluctance of English courts to require lawyers to breach the code of a 
gentleman by being compelled to reveal in court what they had been told by 
clients.”). 
 37. See WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 2290 (stating that the honor doctrine was 
“entirely repudiated” in the late 1700s).  
 38. Id.  
 39. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (“But the privilege is 
that of the client alone . . . .”).  
 40. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the 
Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1087 (1978) (discussing the lack 
of case law on this issue in the United States prior to the 1820s). 
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Parmelee.41 Judge Paddock denied the specific assertion of the 
attorney-client privilege in that case, but strongly supported its 
place in American jurisprudence.42 The privilege continued to 
develop in the United States with utilitarian justifications as its 
underpinnings.43 By the middle of the nineteenth century, the 
Virginia Supreme Court declared that there was “no rule of law 
better settled than” attorneys not being allowed to disclose client 
confidences.44 The attorney-client privilege has remained a stable 
piece of our common law system of justice with relatively few 
modifications.45 
Presently, there is no question whether the attorney-client 
privilege should exist, merely what the scope of the privilege 
should be.46 Courts have contoured the privilege by recognizing 
important limitations to the privilege, such as the crime-fraud 
exception.47 The crime-fraud exception is triggered when 
communications between client and lawyer are made for the 
purpose of getting advice or assistance in the commission of a crime 
or fraud.48 Another recent issue concerning the scope of the 
attorney-client privilege arose in the corporate context.49 The 
 
 41. See Dixon v. Parmelee, 2 Vt. 185 (1829) (discussing the privilege in detail 
and at length in dictum).  
 42. See id. at 188 (stating that the privilege is an established principle, and 
“it is declared repugnant to the policy of the law, to permit the disclosure of secrets 
by him whom the law has intrusted therewith”).  
 43. See KENNETH S. BROUN et al., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 151 (6th ed. 
2006) (resting on utilitarian justifications that allow for franker disclosure by 
clients).  
 44. Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 836 (1871). 
 45. See Marjorie Cohn, The Evisceration of the Attorney-Client Privilege in 
the Wake of September 11, 2001, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1233, 1239 (2003) 
(discussing how the justifications for the privilege have changed slightly, but 
noting the consistent survival of the privilege).  
 46. See Hazard, supra note 40, at 1062 (describing how there is no 
reasonable argument to be made for abolition of the privilege).  
 47. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 556 (1989) (concluding the 
privilege does not apply to communications made for the purpose of furthering 
future wrongdoing).   
 48. See id. at 563 (discussing the purpose of the exception).  
 49. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981) (questioning 
whether the privilege only applied to the members of the management “control 
group” of a corporation). 
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Supreme Court determined that the attorney-client privilege 
extends to communications between corporate counsel and 
employees.50 Notwithstanding the foregoing examples, the 
standard attorney-client privilege doctrine has remained 
remarkably steady in American jurisprudence, while the 
government attorney-client privilege has been in flux during its 
short tenure.51 
B. The Purpose and Importance of the Privilege 
It is essential to understand the purpose of allowing 
communications to remain privileged in light of a criminal 
investigation in order to develop an informed opinion regarding 
whether communications between government lawyers and 
government actors should be privileged under the same 
circumstances.52 John Wigmore identified four fundamental 
conditions that must be met to establish a privilege against 
disclosure:  
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that 
they will not be disclosed. (2) This element of confidentiality 
must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the 
relation between the parties. (3) The relation must be one which 
in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered. 
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure 
of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby 
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.53  
Wigmore believed that only when these conditions were 
present could a privilege be recognized.54 
 
 50. See id. (extending the privilege beyond just the members of the 
upper-echelon of a company). 
 51. Compare R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 2018) (allowing the 
privilege to shield government attorney communications), with In re Lindsey, 158 
F.3d 1263, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that the privilege could not be used to 
shield government attorney communications).  
 52. See Ill. Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289, 292–93 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that 
the court’s decision will rest on “whether the policy reasons for recognizing an 
attorney-client privilege in other contexts apply equally when the United States 
seeks information from a government lawyer”).  
 53. WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 2285. 
 54. See id. (noting that the privileges that exist possess each of these 
conditions, and ones that have been rejected were missing at least one). 
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The foundation of the attorney-client privilege is built on 
allowing individuals to seek the counsel of legal experts free from 
the apprehension of future disclosure of those communications.55 
While the underlying rationale for the attorney-client privilege has 
changed since its original inception, its main concern has always 
been “to encourage full and frank communication between 
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public 
interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.”56 
Recognizing a privilege that allows for the withholding of evidence 
is juxtaposed by the need for all relevant evidence to be presented 
during a trial to ensure an equitable outcome.57 Long established 
in American jurisprudence, it has “been recognized as a 
fundamental maxim that the public . . . has a right to every man’s 
evidence.”58  
While there is extensive scholarly support for the recognition 
of the attorney-client privilege, Jeremy Bentham, a notable 
scholar, opposed the privilege.59 Bentham believed that because 
the innocent had nothing to fear, the individual would not be 
deterred from seeking legal advice and that the guilty not seeking 
legal advice did not harm the administration of justice.60 This 
reasoning has been rejected by American courts, which have 
instead remained steadfast in their protection of communications 
made by both the innocent and guilty.61 While the privilege is 
 
 55. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (saying the rule is 
“founded upon the necessity” for these communications to be protected from 
disclosure).  
 56. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.  
 57. See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (discussing how as 
a principle, the public has a right to all evidence, and exclusionary rules are 
exceptions).  
 58. Id. (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE 
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2192 (3d ed. 
1940)). 
 59. See WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 2291 (declaring Bentham, Lord Langdale, 
and Chief Justice Appleton as the only important names to oppose the privilege).  
 60. See id. (opposing this reasoning, Wigmore went on to provide three 
detailed arguments for why Bentham was incorrect).  
 61. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (making no 
distinction between the guilty and innocent).  
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without doubt an important piece of our justice system, it is an 
exception to the general rule that all evidence shall be presented.62 
C. The Attorney-Client Privilege Application 
The attorney-client privilege is held by the client, who may 
invoke the privilege to protect: “(1) a communication, (2) made 
between privileged persons, (3) in confidence, (4) for the purpose of 
obtaining or providing legal assistance to the client.”63 The Federal 
Rules of Evidence do not provide the substance to the privilege, but 
instead direct courts to interpret the privilege with principles of 
common law “in the light of reason and experience.”64 Federal 
courts use common law to determine if the attorney-client privilege 
exists in the specified context.65 The Supreme Court has noted 
“that the common law is not immutable but flexible, and by its own 
principles adapts itself to varying conditions.”66 The flexibility of 
our common law structure is met head-on by the Court’s call for 
surety and consistency in the application of the privilege.67 
III. The History and Purpose of the Grand Jury 
The Fifth Amendment states that “no person shall be held to 
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.”68 The grand jury 
 
 62. See Bryan, 339 U.S. at 331 (discussing how exceptions from the general 
rule may be justified under certain circumstances).  
 63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000).  
 64. FED. R. EVID. 501. See Winton v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 188 F.R.D. 398, 399 
(N.D. Okla. 1999) (“Rule 501 creates no substantive privileges by its own 
force. Rule 501 simply informs federal courts of how they are to determine 
whether a particular privilege exists.”).  
 65. See Winton, 188 F.R.D. at 399 (discussing the various sources courts will 
look to, such as “state law or common law”).  
 66. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 383 (1933).  
 67. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1996) (rejecting the lower court 
and some state’s decisions to implement a balancing component to the privilege 
because in some circumstances that would leave a client unsure if the 
communications would be confidential).  
 68. U.S. CONST. amend. V.   
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operates as an investigatory body responsible for “determining 
whether or not a crime has been committed.”69 A 1635 grand jury 
in Massachusetts was the first to be used in the United States.70 
Notably, the grand jury was not provided for in the Constitution or 
the Judiciary Act of 1789.71 Grand juries were instead adopted in 
1791 as part of the Bill of Rights.72 The grand jury was established 
“as a primary security to the innocent against hasty, malicious and 
oppressive persecution . . . .”73 The grand jury operates in secrecy, 
justified by the need to protect the reputation of innocent people, 
to prevent warning offenders, and to protect witnesses.74 
The grand jury is a unique body within the criminal justice 
system, broadly inquiring into all relevant facts surrounding 
suspected criminal conduct.75 The grand jury is unique because 
unlike an Article III court that only has jurisdiction over specific 
cases or controversies, the grand jury can investigate simply to 
ensure the law is not being violated.76 Prosecutors in the relevant 
jurisdiction request for a judge to impanel a grand jury.77 The 
 
 69. United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991). 
 70. See RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE’S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1634–1941, at 6 (1963) (discussing how slowly the Colonies were 
to import the grand jury concept from England); see also HANDBOOK FOR FEDERAL 
GRAND JURORS, supra note 1, at 1 (describing the origination of the grand jury in 
the Magna Carta, which was adopted by King John in 1215).  
 71. See Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: 
Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1996) 
(discussing the history of the grand jury in the United States).   
 72. See id. at 11 (discussing how “the centralized government was created 
without a federal grand jury”); U.S. CONST. amend. V. (stating that the federal 
government must utilize the grand jury to charge someone with a federal crime).  
 73. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962). 
 74. See United States v. Providence Tribune Co., 241 F. 524, 526 (D.R.I. 
1917) (discussing the need for secrecy and the harm that could come from a 
newspaper publishing information about the body).  
 75. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972) (“A grand jury 
investigation ‘is not fully carried out until every available clue has been run down 
and all witnesses examined in every proper way to find if a crime has been 
committed.’” (quoting United States v. Stone, 429 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1970))). 
 76. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642–43 (1950) 
(allowing grand jury investigations “merely on suspicion that the law is being 
violated”).  
 77. See Amber Phillips, Grand juries, explained for those who kinda sorta 
know what they are, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2017) https://perma.cc/669Z-V96Q (last 
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grand jury ordinarily consists of sixteen to twenty-three citizens, 
needing twelve votes to issue an indictment based on a finding of 
probable cause.78 The grand jury, unlike a petit jury, does not 
determine guilt or innocence.79 The grand jury is instead tasked 
with determining whether probable cause exists to “believe that a 
crime was committed and that a specific person or persons 
committed it.”80 Also unique to the grand jury is that it may issue 
subpoenas without first identifying a specific offender or offense.81 
Allowing the attorney-client privilege to shield government 
attorneys and employees from answering grand jury subpoenas 
violates the duty public entities have to participate in criminal 
investigations.82 
IV. The Government Attorney-Client Privilege 
A. History of the Government Attorney-Client Privilege 
The government attorney-client privilege is difficult to apply 
because there is no longstanding governmental attorney-client 
privilege in legal history.83 The first time a court considered 
whether the federal government was entitled to claim the 
attorney-client privilege was 1963.84 The court provided almost no 
analysis on the issue of whether the government may claim the 
 
visited Oct. 23, 2019) (listing the mechanics of the grand jury) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 78. See id. (discussing the normal procedures for a federal grand jury); 
HANDBOOK FOR FEDERAL GRAND JURORS, supra note 1, at 6.  
 79. See HANDBOOK FOR FEDERAL GRAND JURORS, supra note 1, at 3 
(describing how a petit jury, or normal trial jury, hears evidence from both the 
prosecution and defense).  
 80. Id. 
 81. See Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919) (explaining that the 
specific offender and offense are normally developed at the end of the grand jury’s 
investigation not at the beginning as in court cases). 
 82. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (describing the 
critical nature of criminal investigations in our justice system).   
 83. See Patricia E. Salkin, Beware: What You Say to Your (Government) 
Lawyer May Be Held Against You – The Erosion of Government Attorney-Client 
Confidentiality, 35 URB. LAW. 283, 287 (2003) (“Unlike the private attorney-client 
privilege, there is no legal tradition of a government privilege.”).  
 84. See United States v. Anderson, 34 F.R.D. 518, 522 (D. Colo. 1963) 
(holding that the documents at issue were not privileged). 
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privilege, simply implying that the government could assert the 
privilege just like a corporation.85 Case law is scarce prior to 1967, 
the same year Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA).86 After FOIA was enacted, government officials had to find 
other ways to protect confidential information.87 While FOIA led 
to an increase in the volume of case law, that case law did not 
necessarily produce a clear justification for the government 
attorney-client privilege.88 Instead, courts applied the privilege in 
the government context through analogy, giving the government 
the privilege because other clients and entities are entitled to the 
privilege.89 The Sixth Circuit in 2005 upheld the government 
attorney-client privilege in the civil context but noted how little 
case law there was on the issue.90 The government, like a 
corporation, is an organizational entity who maintains the 
attorney-client privilege as the client.91 One of the crucial 
differences between corporations and government agencies 
though, is that government agencies are not subject to criminal 
liability.92 
The lack of common law jurisprudence adds to the difficulty in 
the privilege’s application, requiring a close look at the guiding 
 
 85. See id. at 522–23 (citing case law holding corporations have the 
privilege).  
 86. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012) (forcing government agencies to make certain 
information available to the public).  
 87. See Melanie B. Leslie, Government Officials as Attorneys and Clients: 
Why Privilege the Privileged?, 77 IND. L.J. 469, 480 (2002) (discussing the impact 
of FOIA on the development of the government attorney-client privilege). 
 88. See id. at 481 (“[N]either courts nor scholars have made a compelling 
case for a government attorney-client privilege.”).  
 89. See id. at 481–82 (discussing instances of courts applying the corporate 
privilege to the government); see also Galarza v. United States, 179 F.R.D. 291 
(S.D. Cal. 1998) (applying previous Supreme Court holdings that upheld the 
privilege in the corporate context).  
 90. See Ross. v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596, 601 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting 
that the little case law that did exist upheld the governmental attorney-client 
privilege in the civil context).  
 91. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Who “Owns” the Government’s 
Attorney-Client Privilege?, 83 MINN. L. REV. 473, 474 (1998) (discussing who 
controls the privilege in the entity context).  
 92. See Ill. Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289, 293–94 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that 
while the state agency may not be criminally liable, individual employees could 
be). 
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principles of the privilege itself.93 These guiding principles include 
the danger of testimonial privileges violating the long held belief 
that individuals have a right to every man’s evidence.94 Federal 
courts have only recognized privileges in rare circumstances.95 The 
need for evidence is of course contrasted by the desire for 
individuals to be able to openly communicate with their attorney.96  
The attorney-client privilege is meant to “encourage full and 
frank communication between attorneys and their clients . . . .”97 
Sound legal advice is said to serve public ends and receiving such 
advice requires confidentiality.98 The privilege must be narrowly 
construed, though, because it withholds potentially relevant 
evidence during a trial.99 Unlike the private attorney-client 
privilege, the governmental attorney-client privilege is still very 
unsettled.100 
B. Would the Government Attorney-Client Privilege in the 
Criminal Investigation Context be an Extension of the Privilege or 
an Exception? 
The starting point for analysis in this unsettled area of the 
privilege doctrine is to determine whether permitting the 
application of the government attorney-client privilege in light of 
 
 93. See Ross, 423 F.3d at 600 (evaluating the application of the privilege 
based on the principles underlying the privilege). 
 94. See Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d 910, 918 (8th Cir. 1997) (relying 
on the words of Lord Hardwicke and over three centuries of this guiding principle 
being recognized).  
 95. See id. (listing thirteen federal cases where privileges have been allowed 
or contoured); see e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 103 F.3d 1140, 1147 (3d Cir. 
1997) (rejecting a parent-child privilege); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 
335 (1973) (rejecting an accountant-client privilege). 
 96. See Cohn, supra note 45, at 1254 (discussing the need for open 
communication as a rationale for the privilege).  
 97. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
 98. See id. (reviewing precedent for the need to keep such disclosures 
confidential).  
 99. See United States v. Collis, 128 F.3d 313, 320 (6th Cir. 1997) (discussing 
the reduction in discoverable material that will be available during a lawsuit).  
 100. See Salkin, supra note 83, at 287 (“Although most courts agree that there 
is a government attorney-client privilege there is no clear precedent for courts to 
use in determining its scope.”).    
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a criminal investigation would be an exception to, or an extension 
of the attorney-client privilege.101  
When the Supreme Court held in Swidler & Berlin v. United 
States102 that confidences could not be disclosed after a client’s 
death, the Court noted that not protecting the communications 
would amount to an exception to the attorney-client privilege.103 
The Court stated that when the privilege is well-established in 
common law tradition, an argument with strong supporting 
evidence is needed to justify an exception.104 In the instance of the 
privilege applying after death, the Court held that the 
“Independent Counsel has simply not made a sufficient showing to 
overturn the common law rule embodied in the prevailing 
caselaw.”105 A privilege that has a long history of being recognized 
should not be set aside casually.106 
Prior to the In re Lindsey107 decision, there was essentially no 
body of case law to look back on like the Court had in Swidler.108 
Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit determined it was its duty to decide 
whether the privilege extended to government attorneys in the 
criminal grand jury subpoena context “in the light of reason and 
experience.”109 Compare this approach with the one taken by the 
 
 101. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that the 
Office of the President contended that the court would have to find an exception 
to the privilege in the grand jury context, while the Independent Counsel argued 
that allowing the privilege to apply in the grand jury context would be an 
extension). 
 102. 524 U.S. 399 (1998). 
 103. See id. at 410 (“[H]ere we deal with one of the oldest recognized privileges 
in the law. And we are asked, not simply to ‘construe’ the privilege, but to narrow 
it, contrary to the weight of the existing body of caselaw.”).  
 104. See id. at 410–11 (asking for more than speculation in the arguments 
against the survival of the privilege after death, and noting that empirical 
research would have been helpful).   
 105. Id. at 411.  
 106. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47–48 (“Although Rule 501 
confirms the authority of the federal courts to reconsider the continued validity 
of the Hawkins rule, the long history of the privilege suggests that it ought not to 
be casually cast aside.”).  
 107. 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 108. See Swidler, 524 U.S. at 405 (stating that there was a “great body” of 
case law holdings and dicta to refer to). 
 109. FED. R. EVID. 501. See Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1272 (“[W]e believe this case 
poses the question whether, in the first instance, the privilege extends as far as 
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Second Circuit several years later.110 The Second Circuit reasoned 
that an exception to the privilege rule needed to be carved out; this 
reasoning is in line with the dissent in the D.C. Circuit.111 While 
acknowledging a lack of on-point case law, the Second Circuit 
instead relied on the common-law roots of the privilege generally, 
the traditional rationales underlying the privilege, and “the 
existence of a governmental attorney-client privilege in civil suits 
between government agencies and private litigants.”112 These 
diverging approaches seem to come from differing philosophical 
views regarding whether the privilege should apply narrowly or 
broadly.113 
Because the attorney-client privilege is a product of common 
law, the creation of a rule of privilege is done on a case-by-case 
basis.114 The Supreme Court has expressed a desire to exercise the 
Court’s authority to develop rules of privilege in a disciplined 
manner.115 The Second Circuit’s approach is too far out of line with 
the precedent set forth by the Supreme Court to be accepted.116 The 
 
the Office of the President would like.”).  
 110. See United States v. Doe, 399 F.3d 527, 531 (2d Cir. 2005) (beginning 
their analysis from the perspective that the privilege applies in this context). 
 111. See id. at 536 (saying they did not see the question before the court to be 
whether to “extend” the privilege); Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1284 (Tatel J., dissenting) 
(“Denying that they are creating an exception, my colleagues say that they are 
‘defining the particular contours of the government attorney-client privilege,’ but 
no court has suggested that the attorney-client privilege must be extended client 
by client to each new governmental entity, proceeding by proceeding.”).  
 112. See Doe, 399 F.3d at 531–32 (“[O]ur application of the privilege in a ‘new’ 
context remains informed by the long-standing principles and assumptions that 
underlie its application in more familiar territory.”).  
 113. See id. at 531 (“[W]e believe it best to proceed cautiously when asked to 
narrow the privilege’s protections in a particular category of cases.”); In re 
Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[T]he attorney-client privilege 
must be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the 
logic of its principle . . . .” (quoting In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 807 n.44 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982))).  
 114. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (providing courts with the authority to create rules 
of privilege); Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1268 (“Rule 501 manifests a congressional 
desire to provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a 
case-by-case basis . . . .”). 
 115. See Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (reasoning that while 
Rule 501 “provide[s] the courts with flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a 
case-by-case basis, we are disinclined to exercise this authority expansively”). 
 116. See Doe, 399 F.3d at 536 (declining to adopt a ‘public interest’ or 
balancing test, but then simply stating that they will allow the privilege to apply 
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Second Circuit acknowledged that its approach was in direct 
conflict with several other circuits and that it would create an 
inconsistent application of the rules of privilege.117 When a court is 
facing a new area that the attorney-client privilege could be 
applied to, the court should begin by determining if the privilege is 
applicable at all, not assume it does apply and then look for an 
exception.118 
V. Circuit Court Split: Privileged or Not? 
A circuit court split has developed over the last twelve years 
regarding whether a governmental attorney-client privilege exists 
in the face of a federal criminal investigation.119 The First and 
Second Circuits ultimately concluded that the government could 
assert the attorney-client privilege when faced with a criminal 
grand jury subpoena.120 The D.C., Seventh, and Eighth Circuits all 
concluded that the government actors in their cases could not 
utilize the attorney-client privilege to refuse answering criminal 
grand jury subpoenas.121 
 
in this circumstance).  
 117. See id. at 536 n.4 (noting that uniformity is important and prevents 
issues such as forum shopping).  
 118. Compare Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1272 (attempting to determine if this 
instance was captured by the outer limits of the privilege), with Doe, 399 F.3d at 
531 (beginning their analysis from the perspective that the privilege does apply 
in this context). 
 119. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 2018) (acknowledging the 
existence of a split in circuit opinions).  
 120. See id. at 30–31 (refusing to uphold the lower court’s holding that there 
is a categorical rule forbidding governments from asserting the privilege); Doe, 
399 F.3d at 536 (declining to create what the court viewed as an exception to the 
privilege, thus allowing the government to assert the privilege).   
 121. See Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1272 (holding that government lawyers could 
not rely on the privilege to shield information from a grand jury); Ill. Grand Jury, 
288 F.3d 289, 293 (7th Cir. 2002) (refusing to extend the attorney-client privilege 
to communications between government lawyers and government employees 
when the investigation concerns criminal matters); Whitewater Investigation, 112 
F.3d 910, 921 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that the governmental attorney-client 
privilege would violate the principle that government officials should assist in 
criminal investigations). 
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A. First Circuit 
In July 2018, a three judge panel sitting in the Moakley 
courthouse overlooking Boston Harbor heard oral arguments from 
two parties, the United States of America and the state of Rhode 
Island.122 Nearly sixty minutes of strong advocacy from each side 
followed.123 Four months later, the judges issued their opinion with 
Chief Judge Kayatta authoring the writ of mandamus.124 Beyond 
being the most recent circuit to issue an opinion concerning this 
topic, the First Circuit opinion also highlighted serious problems 
with the doctrine as it stands today.125 
The Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training 
(Department) appealed a decision by the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Rhode Island holding that the attorney-client privilege 
is “categorically unavailable to a state government in receipt of a 
federal grand jury subpoena.”126 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit held that there is no categorical rule that a state 
government “has no attorney-client privilege that can be invoked 
in response to a grand jury subpoena.”127 
While portions of the record remain sealed, the First Circuit 
provided some underlying factual context to the district court 
case.128 A federal grand jury subpoenaed records from the 
Department, who in turn moved to partially quash the subpoena 
on the grounds that it would compel the production of privileged 
communications between government counsel and government 
staff.129 The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island 
 
 122. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 27 (arguing for Rhode Island was Neil 
Kelly, Assistant Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island, arguing for the 
United States was Donald Lockhart, Assistant United States Attorney). 
 123. See Oral Argument at 57:00, R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2018), 
https://perma.cc/URR2-N34C (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (noting that the 
arguments were meant to be only half of that time) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 124. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 27 (issuing an advisory mandamus and 
providing his reasoning for why an advisory mandamus is appropriate in this 
case).   
 125. See id. at 31–32 (failing to resolve these serious uncertainties).  
 126. Id. at 27. 
 127. Id. at 32. 
 128. See id. at 27 (discussing the sealed nature of the records but offering a 
brief synopsis of the lower court case).  
 129. See id. (providing no further details due to a presumably still on-going 
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ordered the Department to turn over the documents, denying the 
motion to quash.130 Instead of being held in contempt for not 
complying with a court order, the Department petitioned the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals for a writ of advisory mandamus.131 The 
First Circuit dedicated a significant portion of their opinion to 
deciding whether a writ of advisory mandamus was available in 
this case, ultimately concluding that it was.132  
The court began its substantive analysis by laying a historical 
foundation highlighting how “well-established” the privilege is, but 
also noting that the privilege is not “limitless.”133 The court also 
acknowledged the competing public interests at stake when 
determining the application of the privilege to government 
officials.134 The court cited the four circuits who had previously 
weighed in on this issue.135 Significantly, the court preemptively 
stated that the split in decisions is more even than it appears 
because only the Second and Seventh Circuits involved federal 
grand juries seeking privileged communications from state 
officials.136 
The court continued its analysis by considering the most 
familiar arguments that a government lawyer should not have the 
privilege, “because the lawyers ultimate duty is to the public, that 
the governmental entity need not fear prosecution, and that the 
privilege need be overborne by the public interest in transparent 
 
grand jury investigation). 
 130. See id. (holding that “the attorney-client privilege does not shield 
communications between government lawyers and their clients from a federal 
grand jury” (quoting Order at 2, In re Grand Jury Subpoena (R.I. Dep’t of Labor 
and Training), No. 18-4 WES (D.R.I. Apr. 25, 2018))). 
 131. See id. at 27–28 (forgoing the option of violating the court order, the 
Department sought a writ available only in rare cases).  
 132. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d 26, 28–29 (1st Cir. 2018) (ruling that the 
requisites for a writ of advisory mandamus were satisfied, namely the “novelty of 
the question, its substantial public importance, and its likeliness to recur”).  
 133. See id. at 30 (discussing the need to narrowly construe the privilege 
because of the obstacle it presents to the search for truth).  
 134. See id. (discussing the pros and cons of confidentiality for the public).  
 135. See id. (citing the Seventh, D.C., Eighth, and Second Circuit opinions). 
 136. See id. (stating that the split is essentially even because the Seventh 
Circuit found that the privilege did not apply, and the Second Circuit found that 
it did).  
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government.”137 The court determined that these arguments were 
not dispositive because if taken literally they would not allow 
government attorneys to assert the privilege in response to civil 
subpoenas or discovery requests, violating Supreme Court 
precedent.138 Instead, Judge Kayatta said that more than the 
public nature of the Department is needed.139 The court rejected 
the United States’ argument that the “something more” is a 
subpoena from a criminal grand jury investigating a crime.140 The 
court effectively rejected the proposition that there is a broad no-
privilege rule for government attorneys.141 
The court further distinguished this case from others that 
have held that the privilege does not apply in this context by saying 
that the Eighth and D.C. Circuit cases turned on a federal statute 
requiring federal employees to report wrongdoing.142 Continuing 
this federal-state argument, the court cited the Second Circuit’s 
apparent deference to Connecticut and the state’s decisions 
concerning how to run its own government.143  
Finally, the court addressed a question that was raised during 
oral arguments; should it matter if the grand jury is investigating 
possible criminal conduct by government officials themselves, as 
 
 137. See id. (highlighting the D.C. and Seventh Circuits use of these 
arguments). 
 138. See id. at 31 (“Unless applicable law provides otherwise, the Government 
may invoke the attorney-client privilege in civil litigation to protect confidential 
communications between Government officials and Government attorneys.” 
(citing United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 170 (2011))).  
 139. See id. (“We take from this precedent the conclusion that the public 
nature of the Department cannot itself deem the privilege inapplicable.”). 
 140. See id. (noting that criminal subpoenas are also served on private 
entities who are allowed to assert the attorney-client privilege).  
 141. See id. (“So none of the United States’ principal arguments for sustaining 
the broad ‘no privilege’ rule that the district court adopted can carry the day on 
their own.”).  
 142. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 31 (distinguishing the cases by saying 
that state employees do not have the same reporting requirements as federal 
employees under 28 U.S.C. § 535(b)). Section 535(b) states that any information 
received by an “agency of the executive branch of the Government relating to 
violations of Federal criminal law involving Government officers and employees 
shall be expeditiously reported to the Attorney General.” 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) 
(2012). 
 143. See id. (stating that this conflict “may cut in favor of respecting the 
state’s view of the best balance between the public’s interest in government 
transparency and the beneficial aspects of the privilege”).  
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opposed to the instances in which a grand jury is subpoenaing 
information from the government but in connection to a private 
entities conduct?144 Judge Kayatta stated that the United States’ 
argument would have been much more persuasive if they had 
shown that the grand jury’s subpoena was “targeted at wrongdoing 
by government officials themselves.”145 Judge Kayatta stated that 
in that instance, the public interest would be in “uncovering and 
stopping” crime when it is present in the government itself.146 He 
believed that it was no coincidence that in all three of the circuit 
court decisions holding that the privilege did not apply, there was 
potential wrongdoing by government actors.147 During oral 
arguments, the attorney for the United States would not discuss 
the specific nature of the subpoena, making it clear that they 
opposed a level of judicial oversight that would require prosecutors 
to tell a state whether they were a target, subject, or simply a 
holder of information needed in a criminal investigation.148 
Because the United States did not argue that the wrongdoing being 
investigated was by a government actor, the court found the 
federal government did not tip the balance of public interest in its 
favor.149 
Because Rhode Island’s Attorney General stated that it would 
not be their practice to assert the privilege if they knew the 
investigation was targeted at government misconduct, the court 
did not need to lay out a specific balancing test of when the 
 
 144. See id. (stating that the United States would have a much better 
argument if the potentially criminal conduct was effectuated by a government 
employee). 
 145. Id. at 32. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See id. (outlining how in the Seventh Circuit the suspected wrongdoer 
was a governor, and in the D.C. and Eighth Circuits it was the President of the 
United States).  
 148. See Oral Argument at 34:40, R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2018), 
https://perma.cc/URR2-N34C (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (arguing that this level 
of oversight was not appropriate) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 149. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 32 (“[T]he United States made no 
attempt to persuade the district court that the grand jury’s subpoena is targeted 
at wrongdoing by government officials themselves.”).  
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privilege would be usurped by a grand jury subpoena.150 The court 
granted the writ of mandamus, “directing the district court to 
vacate its denial of the motion to quash.”151 The court declining to 
adopt a broad no-privilege rule was not overly alarming.152 On the 
other hand, the court’s pursuit of identifying where the public’s 
interest lies did lead to alarming results; with the court asking for 
access to secret grand jury information in order to determine 
whether the privilege should apply.153 The court held that there is 
no categorical rule precluding state governments from asserting 
the attorney-client privilege in response to a federal grand jury 
subpoena.154 
B. Second Circuit 
In 2004, a federal grand jury subpoena was issued pursuant 
to an investigation into possible criminal violations by Connecticut 
public officials and employees.155 The U.S. Attorney’s Office was 
investigating whether the governor of Connecticut and his staff 
had received kickbacks for doing public favors.156 The testimony of 
Anne George, the former legal counselor to the Connecticut 
Governor’s Office, was subpoenaed.157 George appeared before the 
 
 150. See id. (leaving that question to presumably be decided by a future 
opinion only if the state attorney general’s office asserted the privilege even after 
being informed that a state agency was believed to be the offender).  
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. at 31 (declaring that the United States did not make an argument 
that would sustain the lower courts categorical no privilege rule).  
 153. See id. at 30 (continuing other circuits’ discussions of public interest 
being a major factor in the determination of the government attorney-client 
privilege issue).  
 154. See id. at 32 (qualifying the holding by saying it was on the record as it 
has been compiled in this case). 
 155. See United States v. Doe, 399 F.3d 527, 528 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[I]n the 
course of investigating possible criminal violations by Connecticut public officials 
and employees, and by private parties with whom the state had done business, a 
federal grand jury subpoenaed the testimony of Anne C. George, former chief legal 
counsel to the Office of the Governor of Connecticut.”).  
 156. See id. (investigating specifically “whether Governor Rowland and 
members of his staff had received gifts from private individuals and entities in 
return for public favors, including the favorable negotiation and awarding of state 
contracts”).  
 157. See id. (explaining that Anne George was the “former chief legal counsel” 
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grand jury and after testifying that conversations did in fact take 
place concerning the receipt of gifts, she asserted the 
attorney-client privilege on behalf of her client, the governor.158 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, ordering 
George to testify, stated that the grand jury’s mission to 
investigate criminal activity clearly outweighed the interest of the 
attorney-client privilege.159 Governor Rowland and the Office of 
the Governor appealed.160 Even though Governor Rowland 
announced his resignation before oral arguments, the court 
confirmed that his successor, Governor Rell, would also decline to 
waive the privilege.161 
The Second Circuit begins its analysis from the standpoint 
that it would “proceed cautiously when asked to narrow the 
privilege’s protections in a particular category of cases.”162 This 
starting point can be contrasted to that taken by other circuits who 
instead proceeded cautiously to expand the privilege’s 
protections.163 The Government made arguments that fall in line 
with the three previous circuits’ holdings.164 The court was 
skeptical about the assumption that the public interest lies in 
disclosure.165 According to the Second Circuit, the balancing of 
 
to the Office of the Governor).  
 158. See id. at 530 (“Accordingly, asserting the privilege on behalf of her 
client, George refused to answer questions pertaining to the content of the 
conversations.”).  
 159. See id. (“[T]he district court concluded that ‘[r]eason and experience 
dictate that, in the grand jury context, any governmental attorney-client privilege 
must yield because the interests served by the grand jury’s fact-finding process 
clearly outweigh the interest served by the privilege.’”). 
 160. See id. (“Both the Office of the Governor and Rowland, as interested 
parties, appealed the district court’s decision.”). 
 161. See id. (“On August 6, 2004, the newly appointed counsel to the Office of 
the Governor informed us that Governor Rell declined to waive the privilege.”). 
 162. Id. at 531. 
 163. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (beginning on the 
basis that the privilege would need to be extended); Ill. Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289, 
293 (7th Cir. 2002) (same). 
 164. See Doe, 399 F.3d at 533 (arguing that the client being a public entity is 
a big difference from private clients, and that revealing information about 
criminal activity is in the public interest).  
 165. See id. (“We cannot accept the Government’s unequivocal assumption as 
to where the public interest lies.”). 
58 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 33 (2020) 
public interest lies between government officials receiving legal 
counsel and the truth-seeking function of the grand jury.166 The 
court settled the balancing of interest question by stating that the 
public interest lies with public officials seeking out and receiving 
competent legal counsel.167 The court quoted a Connecticut state 
statute that it believed showed that the people of Connecticut had 
“concluded that the public interest is advanced by upholding a 
governmental privilege even in the face of a criminal 
investigation.”168 The court in no way held that the state statute 
was dispositive though, and specifically pointed out that they were 
just citing the statute as support for where the public interest 
lies.169 
The court held that the attorney-client privilege applies to 
communications between government actors and government 
lawyers because the public interest is best served by it, and the 
importance of its protections.170 The court also decided that it 
would not adopt some type of balancing test that would determine 
on a case-by-case basis if there was a specific need for evidence that 
the privilege should yield to, citing Supreme Court guidance 
calling for the need for reliable enforcement of the privilege.171 
 
 166. See United States v. Doe, 399 F.3d 527, 534 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Upholding 
the privilege furthers a culture in which consultation with government lawyers is 
accepted as a normal, desirable, and even indispensable part of conducting public 
business. Abrogating the privilege undermines that culture and thereby impairs 
the public interest.”).  
 167. See id. (“It is crucial that government officials, who are expected to 
uphold and execute the law and who may face criminal prosecution for failing to 
do so, be encouraged to seek out and receive fully informed legal advice.”).  
 168. Id.  
 169. See id. (“But we cite the Connecticut statute to point out that the public 
interest is not nearly as obvious as the Government suggests.”).  
 170. See id. (“Upholding the privilege furthers a culture in which consultation 
with government lawyers is accepted as a normal, desirable, and even 
indispensable part of conducting public business. Abrogating the privilege 
undermines that culture and thereby impairs the public interest.”). 
 171. See id. (“The Supreme Court has instructed that, where the 
attorney-client privilege applies, its protections must be reliably enforced in order 
to effectuate its goal of promoting compliance with the law.”).  
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C. D.C. Circuit 
During an investigation by Independent Counsel Kenneth 
Starr into the conduct of Monica Lewinsky and President Bill 
Clinton, a grand jury subpoena was issued to Bruce Lindsey.172 
Bruce Lindsey was Deputy White House Counsel and an Assistant 
to the President.173 When Lindsey testified before the grand jury, 
he refused to answer certain questions, believing that the 
questions asked for information “protected from disclosure by a 
government attorney-client privilege applicable to Lindsey’s 
communications with the President as Deputy White House 
Counsel . . . .”174 The U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia rejected Lindsey’s government attorney-client privilege 
claim, ruling that “the privilege is qualified in the grand jury 
context and may be overcome upon a sufficient showing of need for 
the subpoenaed communications and unavailability from other 
sources.”175 The Office of the President appealed the district court 
order compelling Lindsey’s testimony.176 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia began 
its analysis by acknowledging that the government attorney-client 
privilege exists.177 The court took the approach that under Rule 
501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, it is the court’s duty to define 
“the particular contours of the government attorney-client 
privilege.”178 The court noted that the Supreme Court has not 
 
 172. See Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1267 (investigating financial transactions by 
then President Clinton and whether witnesses had obstructed justice in a civil 
lawsuit against President Clinton). 
 173. See id. (working as a government attorney). 
 174. See id. (refusing to testify, citing the executive privilege as well as the 
attorney-client privilege in his capacity as President Clinton’s personal attorney).   
 175. Id.  
 176. See id. (challenging the district court’s interpretation of the government 
attorney-client privilege).  
 177. See id. at 1270 (discussing how it certainly does exist foundationally, but 
saying whether the Office of the President can assert it in this instance requires 
further analysis). 
 178. See id. at 1272 (“[P]ursuant to our authority and duty . . . to interpret 
privileges ‘in light of reason and experience,’ we view our exercise as one in 
defining the particular contours of the government attorney-client privilege.” 
(quoting FED. R. EVID. 501)).  
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articulated a test for courts to use to determine if an evidentiary 
privilege exists.179 The Supreme Court has stated, though, that 
exclusionary privileges “must be strictly construed and accepted 
‘only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify 
or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the 
normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for 
ascertaining truth.’”180 The D.C. Circuit insinuated that as a 
starting point this meant that it was not trying to find an exception 
to the attorney-client privilege, but instead trying to determine if 
the privilege extended broadly enough to encompass this issue.181 
The court questioned whether Lindsey’s conversations with 
the President even met the basic requirements for asserting the 
privilege, such as being for the purpose of seeking legal advice or 
an opinion of law, from a member of the bar, who was acting as an 
attorney.182 The court reasoned that at least a few of the privileged 
conversation claims would meet the requirements, and the court 
was not precluded from deciding the bigger government 
attorney-client privilege issue.183 
The court also distinguished the role of a government lawyer 
from that of a private attorney.184 The court reasoned that 
government attorneys’ loyalties are to members of the public and 
not solely to their clients or government agencies.185 The court also 
 
 179. See id. at 1268 (discussing alternatively, though, that the Supreme Court 
has “placed considerable weight upon federal and state precedent” (quoting In re 
Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998))).  
 180. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (quoting Elkins v. 
United States, 346 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter J., dissenting)).  
 181. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (explaining that 
the Office of the President contended that not upholding the privilege in this 
instance would amount to an exception, but then going on to say that the court 
viewed it as an extension).  
 182. See id. at 1270 (stating that the record provided by the district court was 
centered more broadly on whether the attorney-client privilege existed, not 
whether it would actually apply to the conversations in question).  
 183. See id. at 1271 (“The parties, we believe, are entitled now to a ruling to 
govern Lindsey’s future grand jury appearance.”).  
 184. See id. at 1272 (“With respect to investigations of federal criminal 
offenses, and especially offenses committed by those in government, government 
attorneys stand in a far different position from members of the private bar.”). 
 185. See id. at 1273 (“Unlike a private practitioner, the loyalties of a 
government lawyer therefore cannot and must not lie solely with his or her client 
agency.”).  
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noted that the public’s interest is in “uncovering illegality among 
its elected and appointed officials.”186 Concerned about these 
public interests, the court proclaimed that “[t]he obligation of a 
government lawyer to uphold the public trust reposed in him or 
her strongly militates against allowing the client agency to invoke 
a privilege to prevent the lawyer from providing evidence of the 
possible commission of criminal offenses within the 
government.”187 As evidence of where the public’s interest lies, the 
court also cited a federal statute that requires government 
agencies to report criminal violations.188 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) 
requires that if a government agency finds evidence of criminal 
violations by government employees, they should be reported to 
the Attorney General.189 The D.C. Circuit made clear that this code 
section did not control this case though, because the Office of the 
President is not a department as defined in this statute.190  
In rejecting the Office of the President’s arguments, the court 
relied heavily on the decision in United States v. Nixon.191 The 
Supreme Court in Nixon created a qualified privilege for executive 
communications, denying the executive full privilege in light of a 
criminal investigation.192 The Court in Nixon laid out how 
committing to the rule of law requires protecting our adversarial 
system of criminal justice, including the presentment of all 
relevant facts.193 The D.C. Circuit explained that it saw no reason 
 
 186. Id.   
 187. Id. 
 188. See id. at 1274 (“[G]overnment officials holding top legal positions have 
concluded, in light of section 535(b), that White House lawyers cannot keep 
evidence of crimes committed by government officials to themselves.”).  
 189. See 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (2012) (requiring the reporting of violations of title 
18 of the U.S. Code).  
 190. See Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1274 (discussing the definition of the statute 
and its inapplicability to this case).  
 191. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974) (recognizing a 
qualified privilege for the executive’s communications). 
 192. See id. (determining that criminal investigations are important enough 
that in certain instances other important rights and privileges would need to step 
aside).  
 193. See id. at 709 (delving into the history of the United States’ criminal 
justice system and the importance of protecting the compulsory process of 
presenting evidence).  
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why a President’s conversations seeking legal advice should be 
given higher protection than those for policy or political advice.194 
While the court did acknowledge that their decision may cause 
communication to be chilled between government actors and 
attorneys, the privilege will not apply only if the communications 
are about criminal wrongdoing.195 
The D.C. Circuit went on to conclude that “it would be contrary 
to tradition, common understanding, and our governmental 
system for the attorney-client privilege to attach to White House 
Counsel in the same manner as private counsel.”196 The court held 
that government lawyers “may not rely on [the] government 
attorney-client privilege to shield such information from disclosure 
to a grand jury.”197 The effect of the opinion was to contour the 
outer bounds of the government attorney-client privilege.198 
D. Eighth Circuit 
President Bill Clinton, and First Lady Hillary Rodham 
Clinton were being investigated by Independent Counsel Kenneth 
Starr for their ties to several corporations in an investigation that 
became known as “Whitewater.”199 The Whitewater investigation 
began years prior to this case and involved business transactions 
that occurred prior to Mr. Clinton’s election as President.200 A 
 
 194. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing how 
only a conceited lawyer could explain why legal advice is more important to the 
executive than policy or political advice). 
 195. See id. at 1276 (“[A]lthough the privacy of these communications may not 
be absolute before the grand jury, the Supreme Court has not been troubled by 
the potential chill on executive communications due to the qualified nature of 
executive privilege.”).   
 196. Id. at 1278.  
 197. Id.  
 198. See id. at 1283 (finding that the attorney-client privilege does not extend 
to this outer limit). 
 199. See Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(investigating their relationships with “Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan 
Association, Whitewater Development Corporation, or Capital Management 
Services, Inc.” (quoting In re Madison Guar. Sav. & Loan Assn, Div. No. 94-1, 
Order at 1–2 (D.C. Cir. Sp. Div. Aug. 5, 1994))). 
 200. See Dan Froomkin, Untangling Whitewater, WASH. POST, 
https://perma.cc/RV8C-VAT9 (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (outlining the 
Whitewater investigation and events that led to grand jury subpoenas) (on file 
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grand jury issued a subpoena requiring the production of 
documents that were created during meetings between Office of 
Counsel to the President’s attorneys and Hillary Clinton regarding 
Whitewater subjects.201 The White House refused to produce the 
notes pertinent to the subpoena “citing executive privilege, 
attorney-client privilege, and the attorney work product 
doctrine.”202 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Arkansas did not reach the question of whether the government 
attorney-client privilege protected the documents, but instead held 
that because the First Lady thought her conversations were 
privileged, the attorney-client privilege applied.203 The Office of 
Independent Counsel appealed.204 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit began by 
asking “whether a governmental attorney-client privilege exists at 
all in the context of a federal criminal investigation.”205 This 
approach is similar to the one taken in Lindsey, where as a starting 
point, the court was not deciding whether these communications 
fit an exception to the privilege but whether a privilege existed at 
all.206 The court found that current case law lacked a clear 
direction on the issue and instead turned to “general principles.”207 
The court discussed general principles such as the right the public 
has to every man’s evidence.208 
 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 201. See Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d at 913 (requiring the documents 
to be produced no matter who else was present at the meetings).  
 202. Id. at 913–14.  
 203. See id. at 914 (“The District Court found it unnecessary to reach the 
broadest question presented by the OIC, whether a federal governmental entity 
may assert the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine in response 
to a subpoena by a federal grand jury.”).  
 204. See id. (“The OIC appealed, and we granted expedited review.”). 
 205. Id. at 915. 
 206. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263,1272 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing the 
competing starting points argued for by the Office of the President and the 
Independent Counsel).  
 207. See Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d at 918 (“Lacking persuasive 
direction in the case law, we turn to general principles.”).  
 208. See id. (starting their analysis from the policy position that individuals 
have a duty to provide testimony in criminal matters).  
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The court reviewed a broad array of potential evidence, 
including Supreme Court decisions in Nixon and Upjohn.209 The 
court distinguished Upjohn by pointing out that unlike 
corporations, the White House cannot be exposed as an entity to 
criminal liability.210 The second distinction the court made was 
that “executive branch employees, including attorneys, are under 
a statutory duty to report criminal wrongdoing by other employees 
to the Attorney General.”211 Lastly, concerning the Upjohn case, 
the court pointed out that it is in the public’s best interest to have 
an open and honest government.212 The Eighth Circuit 
acknowledged that Nixon was distinguishable because President 
Nixon never asserted the attorney-client privilege.213 The court 
still found Nixon “indicative of the general principle that the 
government’s need for confidentiality may be subordinated to the 
needs of the government’s own criminal justice processes.”214 This 
emphasis on the importance of the criminal justice system and its 
ability to overcome testimonial privileges is another one of the 
foundational “general principles” the Eighth Circuit considered.215 
The court believed that “strong public interest in honest 
government and in exposing wrongdoing by public officials would 
be ill-served by recognition of a governmental attorney-client 
privilege applicable in criminal proceedings inquiring into the 
actions of public officials.”216 The court made clear that 
 
 209. See id. at 920 (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence).    
 210. See Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d 910, 920 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he 
actions of White House personnel, whatever their capacity, cannot expose the 
White House as an entity to criminal liability.”); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 
U.S. 383, 386 (1981) (determining the “scope of the attorney-client privilege in the 
corporate context”).  
 211. Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d at 919.  
 212. See id. at 921 (“We believe the strong public interest in honest 
government and in exposing wrongdoing by public officials would be ill served by 
recognition of a governmental attorney-client privilege applicable in criminal 
proceedings inquiring into the actions of public officials.”).  
 213. See id. at 919 (“It is true, as the White House responds, that the 
President did not assert an attorney-client privilege in Nixon, and so the case is 
not directly controlling.”).   
 214. Id. 
 215. See id. at 919–20 (discussing the argument the White House made in 
response to this assertion and the reasons why the court believes the personal 
attorney-client privilege analogies are incorrect).  
 216. Id. at 921. 
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government actors can still maintain privileged communications 
with government attorneys, as long as they do not include criminal 
activity that could be investigated by a grand jury in the future.217 
The court also determined that the Office of Independent Counsel 
was not trying to invade the privilege the First Lady had in her 
personal capacity with her personal lawyer.218 
The court went on to hold that the First Lady’s belief that her 
conversations were privileged did not make them privileged,219 
that the presence of other individuals at the meetings did not affect 
the privilege,220 and that the work product doctrine did not apply 
in this case.221  
This case is significant because as Judge Kopf suggested in his 
dissent, the Eighth Circuit could have adopted an approach that 
more closely mirrored the Supreme Court’s in Nixon.222 Judge Kopf 
believed the government should be entitled to the attorney-client 
privilege and a showing of necessity and relevancy would need to 
be given by the prosecutor in order for the privilege to be set 
aside.223 The court instead held the privilege inapplicable to 
 
 217. See id. (“Because agencies and entities of the government are not 
themselves subject to criminal liability, a government attorney is free to discuss 
anything with a government official—except for potential criminal wrongdoing by 
that official—without fearing later revelation of the conversation.”).  
 218. See id. at 915 (highlighting the White House as the actual party of 
interest); see also In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (making 
clear that government officials retain the attorney-client privilege when 
confidentially communicating with personal counsel).  
 219. See Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d at 923–24 (“Without delving into 
the policy reasons behind these exceptional legal doctrines, we are satisfied that 
there is no compelling reason that a reasonable-mistake-of-law rule should apply 
in the realm of privileges.”). 
 220. See id. at 922 (refusing to extend the common-interest doctrine because 
the requisite common-interest between clients was missing in this case).   
 221. See Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d 910, 924 (8th Cir. 1997) (“The 
White House’s claim of work product immunity founders on the ‘anticipation of 
litigation’ requirement of the doctrine.”).  
 222. See id. at 926–27 (Kopf J., dissenting) (discussing certain procedural 
requirements that should be imposed on the Independent Counsel before the 
documents could be turned over to a grand jury); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 
683, 707 (1974) (resolving the case in a way that allowed for both the judiciary 
and the executive branches to retain the proper level of respect).  
 223. See Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d at 926 (Kopf J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that the special prosecutor should have production requirements and 
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government attorneys in the face of criminal proceedings inquiring 
into the actions of government officials.224 
E. Seventh Circuit 
Federal prosecutors investigating a scandal in the Illinois 
Secretary of State’s office attempted to question Roger Bickel, the 
Chief Legal Counsel to the Secretary of State’s office.225 Bickel had 
provided legal counsel and advice to the Illinois Secretary of State, 
George Ryan, who later became the governor of Illinois.226 The 
scandal consisted of alleged bribe taking, obstruction of justice, 
and the improper use of campaign funds.227 Even after Bickel was 
served with a grand jury subpoena, Ryan continued to fight for 
Bickel to not testify, claiming their communications were 
privileged.228 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois, Eastern Division, granted a motion to compel Bickel’s 
testimony, “finding that no attorney-client privilege attached to 
the communications at issue, and, alternatively, that if a privilege 
did attach, White had effectively waived it.”229 Ryan appealed the 
district court’s ruling, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit reviewed the question de novo.230 
 
then an in camera review would be conducted as well).  
 224. See id. at 921 (majority opinion) (stating in the next sentence that “to 
allow any part of the federal government to use its in-house attorneys as a shield 
against the production of information relevant to a federal criminal investigation 
would represent a gross misuse of public assets”). 
 225. See Ill. Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289, 290 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Because of his 
role in advising then-Secretary Ryan, federal prosecutors sought to discuss these 
matters with Bickel.”).  
 226. See id. (“Roger Bickel was employed by the state of Illinois as Chief Legal 
Counsel to the Secretary of State’s office during the first four years of former 
Secretary (now Governor) George Ryan’s administration.”). 
 227. See id. (involving a three-year investigation by federal prosecutors).  
 228. See id. at 291 (“Ryan continued to oppose all efforts to obtain allegedly 
privileged information from Bickel.”).  
 229. See id. (finding that White, the current Illinois Secretary of State, could 
waive the privilege that would have applied to Bickel and Ryan in their official 
capacities). 
 230. See id. (“We review de novo the question whether Ryan may invoke the 
attorney-client privilege to shield Bickel’s testimony before the federal grand 
jury.”). 
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Opening its analysis in a similar way as the D.C. Circuit and 
Eighth Circuit, the court began by stating that a decision to protect 
government official’s communications with government attorneys 
in light of a federal grand jury subpoena would be an extension of 
the attorney-client privilege.231 Because there are no “deep 
historical roots” or common law traditions for applying a 
government attorney-client privilege that survives a criminal 
investigation, the court resorted to whether policy reasons favor 
the application of the privilege.232  
The first reason the court articulated for not upholding the 
government attorney-client privilege in the wake of a criminal 
investigation is that government lawyers have a “higher competing 
duty to act in the public interest.”233 The court noted that 
government attorneys take an oath to uphold the laws of our 
country or their respective state, and they are paid by the 
taxpayers of that jurisdiction.234 The second reason the court 
provided was that unlike individuals and corporations, “[a] state 
agency . . . cannot be held criminally liable by either the state itself 
or the federal government.”235 This is true because the privilege 
does not attach to the government employee, but to the 
government office itself.236 Because the privilege runs to the office 
and a state agency cannot be held criminally liable, “[t]here is thus 
no need to offer the attorney-client privilege as an incentive to 
 
 231. See id. at 293 (“While we recognize the need for full and frank 
communication between government officials, we are more persuaded by the 
serious arguments against extending the attorney-client privilege to protect 
communications between government lawyers and the public officials they serve 
when criminal proceedings are at issue.”).  
 232. See id. at 292–93 (“Our decision here instead must rest on whether the 
policy reasons for recognizing an attorney-client privilege in other contexts apply 
equally when the United States seeks information from a government lawyer.”).  
 233. Id. at 293. 
 234. See id. (“It would be both unseemly and a misuse of public assets to 
permit a public official to use a taxpayer-provided attorney to conceal from the 
taxpayers themselves otherwise admissible evidence of financial wrongdoing, 
official misconduct, or abuse of power.”).   
 235. Id. at 294.   
 236. See Ill. Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 2002) (“But the privilege 
with which we are concerned today runs to the office, not to the employees in that 
office.”).  
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increase compliance with the laws.”237 The court’s final analysis 
centered on the fact that “the duty of public lawyers to uphold the 
law and foster an open and accountable government outweigh any 
need for a privilege in this context.”238 The court expressly stated 
that the public interest is best served by “good and open 
government, leaving the government lawyer duty-bound to report 
internal criminal violations, not to shield them from public 
exposure.”239 A government employee can also still be protected by 
the attorney-client privilege in the criminal context if they were to 
consult with a private attorney instead.240 The D.C. Circuit has 
also stated that government officials could consult with private 
counsel and retain the traditional privileges protecting their 
confidential communications.241 
While not part of the holding, the Seventh Circuit also 
responded to a federalism argument made by Ryan.242 Ryan 
argued “that even if federal attorneys lack an attorney-client 
privilege in criminal proceedings, state-employed attorneys should 
receive one.”243 This argument was Ryan’s attempt to distinguish 
this case from those previously heard in the D.C. Circuit and 
Eighth Circuit.244 The court found no reason to distinguish 
between state and federal attorneys, and refused to recognize an 
evidentiary privilege that would impair legitimate federal 
interests.245 Because the court ruled that none of the 
 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id.  
 239. Id.   
 240. See id. (“An officeholder wary of becoming enmeshed in illegal acts may 
always consult with a private attorney, and there the privilege unquestionably 
would apply.”). 
 241. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing how 
government counsel in this case was trying to say they were assisting the 
President in a personal capacity).  
 242. See Ill. Grand Jury, 288 F.3d at 294 (“Ryan makes one final argument in 
favor of his assertion of a governmental privilege: in a word, federalism.”).  
 243. Id. at 294–95. 
 244. See id. at 295 (“Neither of the cases on which Ryan relies offered a square 
holding that an attorney-client privilege exists between state government lawyers 
and their state clients that can override the interests of a federal grand jury.”); 
Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1274 (attempting to distinguish that all of the government 
actors in this case were federal); Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d 910, 913 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (same). 
 245. See Ill. Grand Jury, 288 F.3d at 295 (“Having already determined that 
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communications between Bickel and Ryan were privileged, there 
was no reason for it to decide if the new Illinois Secretary of State 
could waive the privilege for conversations that took place prior to 
him assuming office.246 
VI. Resolving the Circuit Split: Is a Factors Test or Categorical 
Approach Appropriate? 
A. Should it Matter Whether the Grand Jury Subpoena is Issued 
to a Federal versus State Government? 
Several of the circuit court opinions involved a federal grand 
jury issuing a subpoena to a state government or actor.247 While 
not part the court’s holding, the First Circuit briefly addressed the 
federal-state conflict.248 Judge Kayatta stated that the 
federal-state nature of the conflict may favor allowing a state to 
best address the balance of transparency and confidentiality for 
themselves.249 The court went on to rhetorically ask why a federal 
grand jury should be able to “overrule a state’s decision on how best 
to operate its own government when there is no claim of 
wrongdoing by state officials?”250 The court pointed to the Second 
 
the policy reasons behind the attorney-client privilege do not justify its extension 
to government attorneys in the context of criminal investigations, we decline the 
invitation to make any distinction between state and federal attorneys for 
ill-defined reasons of federalism.”).  
 246. See id. (expressing no opinion on the determination made by the district 
court concerning this issue). 
 247. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d 26, 27 (1st Cir. 2018) (discussing whether 
a state government can invoke the attorney-client privilege against a federal 
grand jury subpoena); United States v. Doe, 399 F.3d 527, 528 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(discussing whether the Office of the Governor of Connecticut was required to 
reveal to a federal grand jury the contents of private conversations); Ill. Grand 
Jury, 288 F.3d 289, 290 (7th Cir. 2002) (discussing whether a state government 
lawyer could refuse to disclose communications in light of a federal grand jury 
subpoena).  
 248. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 31–32 (rejecting a categorical rule that 
a state cannot assert the attorney-client privilege in response to a grand jury 
subpoena).  
 249. See id. at 31 (stating that it would be respecting the state’s own views, 
but not citing any Rhode Island guidance).  
 250. Id. 
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Circuit opinion for support, but the Second Circuit decision did not 
address that question directly.251  
The Second Circuit specifically discussed how it is not bound 
by the laws of privilege in the states.252 Furthermore, when the 
court discussed a state statute that would uphold the 
governmental privilege for state prosecutors in light of a criminal 
investigation, it simply discussed it as context for where the public 
interest may lie.253 Even in upholding the governmental 
attorney-client privilege, the Second Circuit did not create a 
distinction between state and federal actors being served with a 
federal grand jury subpoena.254 
The Seventh Circuit specifically addressed whether it should 
matter that the federal grand jury subpoena was directed to a state 
government.255 The State argued that even if a federal attorney 
lacked the privilege, federalism concerns should mean that a state 
attorney would retain the privilege.256 The court acknowledged 
that the Eighth Circuit, in dicta, noted that a serious federalism 
problem could have been implicated in the case if the subpoena had 
been issued to a state attorney.257 Recognizing federalism as being 
important in general, the Seventh Circuit still saw no reason why 
state lawyers should be treated differently from federal lawyers.258 
The court cited Supreme Court precedent saying it is clear that 
“the United States may still sue a state to enforce the nation’s 
 
 251. See Doe, 399 F.3d at 530 (discussing how the federal court is not bound 
by the law of privilege in the state, and never explicitly presenting a federalism 
argument).  
 252. See id. (citing Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence saying it 
requires the application of federal law).  
 253. See id. at 534 (conceding that if it was a state prosecutor seeking the 
information in state court, then the privilege would not apply).  
 254. See id. at 536 (refusing to qualify the privilege under these 
circumstances).  
 255. See Ill. Grand Jury, 288 F.3d at 295 (discussing both recent case law and 
an argument made by the state attorney).  
 256. See id. (arguing that leading case law concerned federal agencies not 
state agencies).  
 257. See id. at 294–95 (discussing the argument in detail, but dismissing the 
Eighth Circuit quote as dicta); Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d 910, 917 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (discussing a Sixth Circuit case by saying that the federal-state conflict 
“implicates potentially serious federalism concerns”). 
 258. See Ill. Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that a 
different result is unjustified by this nuance).  
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laws.”259 The court reasoned that this “structural fact” concerning 
the federal system implies that there is no immunity enjoyed by 
state lawyers from a federal grand jury subpoena.260 The court 
went on to note that “federal courts have never afforded an 
evidentiary privilege to the states that is not also afforded to the 
federal government.”261 Affording the state this privilege would 
impair the legitimate federal interest in enforcing criminal 
statutes, and no distinction should be made between state and 
federal attorneys.262 
B. Should the Court Exercise Judicial Oversight over the Grand 
Jury? 
In Judge Kayatta’s analysis of whether the public interest 
weighed in favor of the privilege applying or not, he added to the 
list of factors whether the suspected wrongdoing was committed by 
a government actor.263 The First Circuit was the first of the circuit 
courts to question whether the analysis should hinge on who is the 
target of the subpoena.264 
The Department of Justice’s Justice Manual says that the 
target of an investigation “is a person as to whom the prosecutor 
or the grand jury has substantial evidence linking him or her to 
the commission of a crime and who, in the judgment of the 
prosecutor, is a putative defendant.”265 The subject of an 
investigation “is a person whose conduct is within the scope of the 
 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id.  
 261. Id. 
 262. See id. (declining to “make any distinction between state and federal 
attorneys for ill-defined reasons of federalism”). 
 263. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2018) (saying that the U.S. 
attorney had not attempted to persuade the court that the subpoena was targeted 
at government misconduct).  
 264. See id. (highlighting that all three of the circuits who decided that the 
privilege did not apply were clearly deciding the issue knowing that a government 
actor was the target of the subpoena).  
 265. Justice Manual, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://perma.cc/G3EQ-SUJ6 (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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grand jury’s investigation.”266 The First Circuit opinion does not 
get into the granularity of subject versus target, or a general 
person of interest, but clearly states that a lot of weight would be 
given to a determination that the subpoena is targeted at 
government wrongdoing.267 
During the July oral arguments in the First Circuit case, the 
State of Rhode Island brought up that the Department did not 
know if it was a target or subject of the federal grand jury’s 
investigation.268 The judges posited to the Assistant United States 
Attorney (AUSA) arguing the case, that maybe the judiciary 
should have oversight over the investigation including finding out 
if the person or agency being investigated is the subject or the 
target of the investigation.269 This determination would then be 
factored into the judge’s decision concerning whether or not the 
government agency or employee’s communications would be 
privileged or not.270 Judge Kayatta’s opinion indicates that if the 
United States had revealed who was the target of the 
investigation, the scales may have tipped in their favor.271 The 
AUSA made clear during oral arguments that the government did 
not believe that this type of hairsplitting judicial oversight over 
grand jury subpoenas was the correct solution.272 The AUSA 
highlighted the broad investigatory powers of the grand jury and 
 
 266. Id. 
 267. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 32 (stating simply that the balance may 
have been tipped by this revelation).  
 268. See Oral Argument at 1:27, R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2018), 
https://perma.cc/URR2-N34C (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (distinguishing this case 
from the other four circuit opinions where the government actor was the 
suspected wrongdoer) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 269. See id. at 33:30 (discussing the effect of adopting a categorical no 
privilege rule, and saying that maybe the government should have to make some 
further representation for needing the information). 
 270. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 32 (discussing how this information 
would have been factored into the decision).  
 271. See id. (stating that a grand jury investigating possible criminal conduct 
within the government would have “reinforce[d] and heightened” the importance 
of their arguments).  
 272. See Oral Argument at 34:40, R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2018), 
https://perma.cc/URR2-N34C (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (claiming that this type 
of oversight would be “completely unworkable in practice”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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its pursuit to show innocence not just criminal wrongdoing.273 
Finally, the AUSA emphasized that it makes no sense to have a 
rule where the “analysis rises or falls on the current status of state 
employees in the grand jury’s investigation.”274  
The grand jury was purposefully separated from the other 
three branches of government by the Framers.275 The grand jury is 
independent from the judiciary “both in the scope of its power to 
investigate criminal wrongdoing and in the manner in which that 
power is exercised.”276 The Supreme Court has made their cautious 
approach clear; “given the grand jury’s operational separateness 
from its constituting court, it should come as no surprise that we 
have been reluctant to invoke the judicial supervisory power as a 
basis for prescribing modes of grand jury procedure.”277 Courts 
should not adopt a rule that requires them to parse through grand 
jury proceedings and investigations in order to identify who at the 
moment of the issuance of a subpoena is a target or subject of the 
investigation.278  
Forcing the government to explain too many details 
surrounding a subpoena could compromise “the indispensable 
secrecy of grand jury proceedings.”279 Asking for secret grand jury 
proceeding information is another reason why courts should not 
continue trying to identify where the public interest lies 
 
 273. See id. at 35:55 (highlighting how practically, the documents being 
sought very well may shed a favorable light on the parties). 
 274. Id. at 30:01.  
 275. See Roger A. Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional Design, 
93 CORNELL L. REV. 703, 726 (2008) (“While modern grand jury practice may not 
evidence the fact, the grand jury is its own constitutional entity, which checks 
each of the three branches of government.”); In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1278 
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (“The grand jury, a constitutional body established in the Bill of 
Rights, ‘belongs to no branch of the institutional Government, serving as a kind 
of buffer or referee between the Government and the people[.]’” (quoting United 
States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 27 (1992))). 
 276. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 48 (1992).   
 277. Id. at 49–50.  
 278. See id. at 48 (discussing the functional independence of the grand jury 
and their lack of a need to seek the permission of a court to initiate investigations 
or issue indictments).  
 279. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943). 
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concerning whether the government attorney-client privilege 
should apply or not.280  
C. Should Courts Employ a Balancing Test? 
Courts could adopt and utilize a balancing test to determine if 
the attorney-client privilege should apply in a particular instance 
as a small number of states have done.281 This test would weigh 
the privacy interests of the individual against the evidentiary 
interests in disclosure.282 Applying this type of balancing test 
would require the court to make ad hoc decisions.283 This would 
create a privilege contingent on the factors the court chose to 
introduce to determine public interest and the weight the court 
gave to those particular factors.284 
The D.C. Circuit avoided creating a balancing test rule.285 
Instead, it concluded that the attorney-client privilege could not be 
asserted to avoid turning over information related to possible 
criminal violations.286 The Second Circuit also decided that it 
would not adopt some type of balancing test that would determine 
on a case-by-case basis if there was a specific need for evidence that 
the privilege should yield to.287 Both courts cited Supreme Court 
 
 280. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2018) (looking at public 
interest factors such as who is the target of the grand jury investigation).  
 281. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 32, § 7005 (1964) (forbidding social 
workers from testifying about communications made with a client, unless upon a 
balancing of administration of justice concerns a court deems it necessary).  
 282. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1357 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Accordingly, 
we will determine the appropriate scope of the privilege ‘by balancing the 
interests protected by shielding the evidence sought with those advanced by 
disclosure.’”(quoting In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 640 (6th Cir. 1983))).  
 283. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996) (“Making the promise of 
confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge’s later evaluation of the relative 
importance of the patient’s interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for 
disclosure . . . .”).  
 284. See id. (discussing the nature of a balancing test analysis as contingent 
on a judge’s decision).  
 285. See Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1278 (“Our analysis, in addition to having the 
advantages mentioned above, avoids the application of balancing tests to the 
attorney-client privilege—a practice recently criticized by the Supreme Court.”).  
 286. See id. (adding that this conclusion avoided the subjective approach 
proposed by the district court).  
 287. See United States v. Doe, 399 F.3d 527, 535 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Having 
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case law that cautioned against the creation of a balancing test.288 
Although, the Supreme Court in its seminal executive privilege 
case essentially employed a balancing test approach.289 The 
Court’s decision to utilize a balancing test is distinguishable 
because the Court in Nixon was focused on separation of powers 
issues, which inherently requires the balancing of competing 
interests.290 
The biggest problem with employing a balancing test is that it 
creates uncertainty concerning which communications will be 
protected by the privilege.291 Attorneys working for the 
government need to be able to accurately advise government 
employees concerning which confidential communications will be 
privileged and which will not.292 The Supreme Court has made 
 
determined that the attorney-client privilege applies to the communications at 
issue in this case, we decline to fashion a balancing test . . . .”). 
 288. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996) (“We reject the balancing 
component of the privilege implemented by that court and a small number of 
States.”); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (“An uncertain 
privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying 
applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.”); In re Lindsey, 
158 F.3d 1263, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing specifically to Swidler & Berlin v. 
United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409 (1998)).  
 289. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (“Since we conclude 
that the legitimate needs of the judicial process may outweigh Presidential 
privilege, it is necessary to resolve those competing interests in a manner that 
preserves the essential functions of each branch.”). 
 290. See id. (“In designing the structure of our Government and dividing and 
allocating the sovereign power among three co-equal branches, the Framers of the 
Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers 
were not intended to operate with absolute independence.”).  
 291. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409 (1998) 
(“Balancing ex post the importance of the information against client interests, 
even limited to criminal cases, introduces substantial uncertainty into the 
privilege’s application. For just that reason, we have rejected use of a balancing 
test in defining the contours of the privilege.”); Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 
(1996) (“Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge’s 
later evaluation of the relative importance of the patient’s interest in privacy and 
the evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of the 
privilege.”); Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393 (“[I]f the purpose of the attorney-client 
privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with some 
degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected.”).   
 292. See Swidler, 524 U.S. at 409 (describing the importance of a certain and 
irrefutable privilege).  
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clear that an uncertain privilege “is little better than no privilege 
at all.”293 
There are two reasons why the application of the 
attorney-client privilege to government attorneys advising 
government employees in light of a criminal investigation should 
not be decided utilizing a balancing test. First, before the client 
discloses information to their attorney, the attorney should be able 
to accurately advise their client concerning the privilege’s specific 
application.294 An uncertain privilege has been characterized as 
undemocratic, and being no better than having no privilege at 
all.295 Second, for any privilege to be effective, it must be 
administered uniformly.296 It makes no sense to argue that an 
absolute privilege is necessary in order for clients to be candid with 
their attorneys and then argue that the privilege “should turn on 
the nature of the proceedings in which the privilege is asserted.”297 
The correct approach would be to either contour the privilege from 
extending to these specific communications, or simply say that the 
privilege will apply.298  
VII. Conclusion 
No matter the underlying rationale chosen to justify the 
attorney-client privilege, it is an unquestionably “crucial fixture of 
 
 293. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393. 
 294. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996) (stating that an attorney 
promising confidentiality and then having a trial judge later make a 
determination of the validity of the privilege in that instance would “eviscerate 
the effectiveness of the privilege”); Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393 (discussing how an 
uncertain privilege is not much better than no privilege at all); Conn. Mut. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 458 (1876) (“If a person cannot consult his legal 
adviser without being liable to have the interview made public the next day by an 
examination enforced by the courts, the law would be little short of despotic.”).  
 295. See Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 94 U.S. at 458 (describing an uncertain 
privilege as “despotic” meaning arbitrary, undemocratic, or even 
unconstitutional).   
 296. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393 (discussing how the lower court created a 
difficult to apply test that would create unpredictability in its application by 
courts). 
 297. See Leslie, supra note 87, at 496 (pointing out the inconsistencies in these 
arguments).  
 298. See id. (“So long as the privilege’s concern is with governmental rather 
than personal needs, there is no need for additional privilege protection.”).  
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the American criminal justice system.”299 An illimitable privilege 
would prove prejudicial to the administration of justice, though, 
and the outer contours of the privilege must be clearly defined.300 
The government attorney-client privilege is an area of the privilege 
doctrine that has been muddied.301 Five circuits have not been able 
to provide clear guidance concerning which communications 
between government lawyers and government employees, in the 
face of a criminal grand jury subpoena, will remain privileged and 
which will not.302 This uncertainty must be resolved in a way that 
affected parties, prior to engaging in important and consequential 
conversations, know where the privilege begins and ends.303 A 
categorical rule is the most appropriate and equitable answer. 
Employing a balancing test would yield inequitable and 
inconsistent results.304 Even just the discussion of public interest 
 
 299. See Cohn, supra note 45, at 1254 (reciting three rationales for the 
attorney-client privilege; “professional ethics, the right to privacy or the need to 
encourage clients to confide fully in their attorneys”).  
 300. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989) (discussing the 
importance of the crime-fraud exceptions and its necessity in maintaining the 
function of the American adversary system).  
 301. See, e.g., R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2018) (failing to 
sustain a broad no privilege rule, reasoning that something more is required to 
prevent the state from having the right to assert the privilege); In re Lindsey, 158 
F.3d 1263, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating that “government officials have 
responsibilities not to withhold evidence relating to criminal offenses from the 
grand jury”).  
 302. See Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d 910, 924 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(declining to apply the attorney-client privilege); Ill. Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289, 
295 (7th Cir. 2002) (same); Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1283 (same). But see United 
States v. Doe, 399 F.3d 527, 536 (2d Cir. 2005) (failing to abrogate the 
attorney-client privilege by compelling chief legal counsel to disclose 
communication with the governor of Connecticut); R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 
32 (failing to uphold a categorical rule that would block states from asserting the 
privilege in the face of a federal criminal grand jury subpoena).  
 303. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (stating that 
for the privilege to serve its purpose the “attorney and client must be able to 
predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be 
protected”).  
 304. See United States v. Doe, 399 F.3d 527, 534 (2d Cir. 2005) (determining 
that the public interest was in government officials being able to speak openly 
and honestly with government counsel). But see Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1273 
(discussing the public interest in “uncovering illegality among its elected and 
appointed officials”).  
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factors led the First Circuit into an inappropriate area of judicial 
oversight.305 The grand jury is meant to operate as an entity with 
broad investigatory powers and minimal judicial oversight.306 This 
is not meant to imply that the grand jury is without oversight at 
all, or that it should operate outside of the confines of the 
Constitution or common law testimonial privileges.307 Testimonial 
privileges certainly apply in the grand jury context.308 This Note in 
no way suggests that they should not, but also recognizes 
jurisprudence cautioning against “[f]requent or undue court 
intervention in the proceedings of a grand jury . . . .”309 Other 
issues have arisen when courts attempted to identify public 
interest including; inconsistent opinions,310 the use of varying 
factors,311 and the underlying need for a certain privilege.312 In 
short, the balancing of public interests has not worked and should 
be declined altogether.313 
It should not matter whether the federal grand jury has issued 
a criminal subpoena to a state or federal government person or 
 
 305. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 32 (discussing how the United States’ 
argument for abrogating the privilege would have been stronger if they had 
disclosed information normally kept secret by a grand jury). 
 306. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1973) (stating that for 
the grand jury to performs its constitutional function, “it must be free to pursue 
its investigations unhindered by external influence or supervision so long as it 
does not trench upon the legitimate rights of any witness called before it”); United 
States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 50–51 (1992) (highlighting the Court’s reluctance 
for imposing judicial oversight over the grand jury).  
 307. See Williams, 504 U.S. at 48 (discussing the outer limits of the grand 
jury’s power).  
 308. See In re Grand Jury Investigation of Hugle, 754 F.2d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 
1985) (finding that the confidential marital communications privilege could be 
asserted in light of a grand jury subpoena).  
 309. Id. at 864.   
 310. See Doe, 399 F.3d at 534 (discussing the public interest weighing against 
allowing the privilege). But see Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1273 (stating that the court 
would not apply a balancing test, but discussing the public’s interest in 
disclosure). 
 311. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 31–32 (introducing the factor 
considering who is the target of the investigation); Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1272 
(discussing federal statutes calling for federal employees to uphold a 
constitutional government).  
 312. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393 (calling for a privilege that enables 
individuals to make informed decisions concerning protected disclosure). 
 313. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (refusing to create 
a balancing test).  
IN RE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE 79 
  
entity.314 In light of the underlying policy rationales, there is not a 
compelling reason to extend the attorney-client privilege to 
government attorneys faced with a criminal grand jury 
subpoena.315 The attorney-client privilege comes at a cost.316 Every 
time a testimonial privilege is honored, potentially relevant 
evidence is not presented.317 
Testimonial privileges should be consistent and certain.318 
Justice O’Connor wrote that the Supreme Court would be reluctant 
to expand or create a new privilege unless to “do so will serve a 
‘public good transcending the normally predominant principle of 
utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.’”319 Government 
attorneys withholding evidence from the purview of a criminal 
grand jury subpoena is not serving the public good. A categorical 
rule preventing government attorneys from asserting the 
attorney-client privilege in response to criminal grand jury 
subpoenas is the most fitting conclusion. 
 
 
 
 314. See Ill. Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2002) (concluding 
federalism concerns were not relevant in this situation).  
 315. See id. (failing to find a justifiable reason for extending the privilege).  
 316. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (“[S]ince the 
privilege has the effect of withholding relevant information from the factfinder, it 
applies only where necessary to achieve its purpose.”).  
 317. See id. (discussing this withholding of evidence as a compelling reason 
for limiting privileges to those that are necessary).  
 318. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409 (1998) (trying 
to keep uncertainty out of the privilege doctrine). 
 319. Id. at 411 (O’Connor J., dissenting) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 
445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)).  
